[Bài bình luận] Impossible Dreams of Korean Unification

Trung tâm Nghiên cứu Quốc tế (SCIS) xin trân trọng giới thiệu bài bình luận "Impossible Dreams of Korean Unification" của ThS. Đoàn Ngọc Anh Khoa (hiện đang là NCV cộng tác của Trung tâm SCIS). Bài bình luận phân tích những yếu tố kỹ thuật trong Tuyên bố chung Nam - Bắc năm 1972, dẫn đến thế lưỡng nan của tình hình trên bán đảo Triều Tiên cho đến thời điểm hiện nay. Quan điểm trong bài viết thể hiện lập trường riêng của tác giả, không đại diện cho quan điểm của Trung tâm SCIS.

 

Image result for korean unification
 

 

IMPOSSIBLE DREAMS OF KOREAN UNIFICATION


On July 23rd, 1953, little over three years after the Korean War was started by North Korea’s surprise attack, the Korean peninsula was divided. The end of the Korean War was the beginning of a division which lasted for more than half a century to this day. The onset of the Cold War created two vastly different trajectories for North and South Korea. Powerless, Koreans were unable to form a unified government, separated by the hegemony of the two major super powers’ interest in the region. The South, embraced capitalistic and democratic ideas, whereas their counterparts, the North, embraced communism and military dictatorship. At present, South Korea is one of the most successful and prosperous states in Asia, whereas North Korea is now a rogue state that hampers regional order. Despite these differences, both Koreas have set “unification”[1] as their ultimate goal, an aim incorporated into the constitution of both countries.

 

The 1972 Flaws in South-North Joint Statement       

          

The 1972 South-North Joint Statement was a broad agreement between South and North Korea on unification policies. It has three primary points. First, unification must be achieved internally or with no reliance on external forces or interference. Second, reunification must be achieved peacefully without the use of military force against the other side. Third, both parties must promote national unity as a national goal despite any differences in ideological and political systems. These statements obscured the ulterior motives of both North and South Korea.


The true motive of the Joint Statement was not in unification, but rather lay in assuring the security of both countries. This statement was the direct result of America’s normalization of relationship with China which threatened the existence of both Koreas. Diplomatic normalization with China posed a different problem, approximately 30 percent American soldiers were pulling out of South Korea as a sign of trust to the Chinese government.[2]Similarly, China’s role as an ideological ally of North Korea was significantly diminished. With these rapid changes and potential uncertainty, South and North Korea felt compelled to sign a security agreement to assure the sovereignty of both countries. However, since this agreement was never really signed in good faith, almost all the articles of the agreement were violated. This agreement was in other sense, was an implicit way of saying, “let each of us pursue our own paths.”

 

Prisoner’s Dilemma in the Korean Peninsula


Prisoner’s dilemma is a situation where both prisoners would benefit more if they co-operated. However, because each prisoner does not trust the other, each prisoner elects to choose the second best option. This is exactly the situation with North and South Korea. A long history of distrust and hatred has prevented both sides from cooperating.


Possible Game Matrix for Unification

South Korea / North Korea

Trust

Defect

Trust

Gain for both

Loss for South Korea

Defect

Loss for North Korea

Loss for both

 

From South Korea’s point of view, the reasons for the suspicion dates back to North Korea’s surprise attack in 1950. During the Korean War, South Korea’s capital, Seoul, changed hands three times. Koreans on both sides experienced the tragedy of fratricide and both sides committed atrocities. Local communists punished “capitalists” and capitalists took revenge on the “red elements” as both armies advanced and retreated. Each side blamed the other.[3]


Ill-fated attempts by some of Korea’s independence fighters such as Kim Gu and Kim Kyu-Sik to form a unified national government with North Korea’s communists created dissent in the South. Many South Korean leaders such as Sygnman Rhee, Chang Myong, and Park Chung-Hee were deeply skeptical about North Korea. Both the incumbent party and opposition parties led by Yoon Bo-Sun, Lee Chul-Sung, and others were staunchly anti-communist. Common distrust of North Koreans made it almost impossible to create a positive environment to discuss reunification.[4]


North Korean leaders also did not trust South Korean leaders. North Korean leaders, such as Kim Il Sung, Choi Yong Kon, Park Sung Chul and many others fought against the Japanese Empire, and many of their companions were tortured or executed. On the other hand, many South Korean leaders did not have the same legitimacy. South Korean leaders, such as Prime Minister Chang Myong, collaborated with the Japanese authorities. President Park Chung Hee and former Speaker of National Assembly, Chung Il Kwon, were army officers in the Japanese Empire. North Korean leaders viewed South Korean leaders to be traitors and opportunists, making political negotiation more difficult.[5]


Due to the reasons mentioned above, both Koreas today maintain very large military forces in order to secure their borders. South Korea violated the first principle of the 1972 South-North Joint Statement by allowing external forces (American troops) to be stationed in Korea. On the other hand, North Korea developed nuclear weapons which threatens and holds hostage Seoul, the capital of South Korea.

 

Current Situation


Historically, there was a strong desire for unification in South Korea. However, this desire has waned and in a recent survey in 2014, 42.7 percent of university students responded “no” to reunification due to the potential economic hardships that will hit South Korea.[6] Young male Koreans who are drafted for military duty were disillusioned and angered by North Korea’s recent transgressions-the unprovoked surprise attack and sinking of South Korea’s patrol corvette, Cheonan, and the bombing of Yeonpyong island which targeted civilians for the first time since the end of the Korean War.


Unlike West Germany, South Korea does not have a unification tax. President Lee Myung-Bak proposed this tax in a bill in 2010; however, domestic opposition pressured the government and prevented the passage of this bill.[7] This reflects public sentiment and the lack of interested in unification. Even though Germany prepared for unification, collecting taxing ten years prior to the fall of East Germany, tax reserves were still not sufficient.[8]

 

After the impeachemnt of Ms. Park’s conservative policy towards North Korea, Moon Jae-in appears to favour improving relations with the North by having a summit with Kim Jong-un for the first time after a decade in April 2018. Mr. Moon commented whether there is no peace, there is no unification.

 

Nevertheless, considering that West Germany in comparison to South Korea was a much richer state and how East Germany at least had a much better economic infrastructure than North Korea, the cost of Korea’s unification is simply unpredictable.

 

Ngoc Anh Khoa Doan is a lecturer at Faculty of International Relations, University of Social Sciences and Humanities Ho Chi Minh City. He achieved his Master in Asian Politics from University of London, London, UK and has always been interested in East Asian security affairs. He got his Bachelor’s degree from Canada. 



 

[1]Article 4 of South Korean Constitution: The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy

Article 9 of North Korean Constitution: The DPRK shall strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea by strengthening the people’s power and vigorously performing the three revolutions- the ideological, cultural, and technical– and reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.

[2] Nam, Joo. America’s Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print. p. 78.

[3] “Issues and Problems of Korean Reunification.” Korean Reunification: New Perspectives and Approaches. Ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak, Chonghan Kim, and HoonNack Kim, Seoul: Kyungnam University, 1984. Print.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]강근주. “대학생 42.7% 남북통일반대… 이유 1위, 경제부담.” <에너지경제>, 2014년 10월 28일작성.

[7]채원배. “李대통령 “통일세준비할때됐다” <머니투데이>, 2010년 8월 15일작성.

[8]이상원. “李대통령언급 ‘통일세’는무엇?”, <조세일보>, 2010년 8월 16일작성.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

Góp ý
Họ và tên: *  
Email: *  
Tiêu đề: *  
Mã xác nhận:
 
 
RadEditor - HTML WYSIWYG Editor. MS Word-like content editing experience thanks to a rich set of formatting tools, dropdowns, dialogs, system modules and built-in spell-check.
RadEditor's components - toolbar, content area, modes and modules
   
Toolbar's wrapper  
Content area wrapper
RadEditor's bottom area: Design, Html and Preview modes, Statistics module and resize handle.
It contains RadEditor's Modes/views (HTML, Design and Preview), Statistics and Resizer
Editor Mode buttonsStatistics moduleEditor resizer
 
 
RadEditor's Modules - special tools used to provide extra information such as Tag Inspector, Real Time HTML Viewer, Tag Properties and other.